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Casenotes
THE RIGHT OF AN ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY
TO DRAW INFERENCES
Radio Officers' Union v. National Labor
Relations Board,
National Labor Relations Board v. International
Brotherhood of Teamsters,
Gaynor News Company, Inc. v. National Labor
Relations Board'
By GARY W. SMrr*
A disagreement between the Federal Courts of Appeals
over the interpretation of section 8(a) (3) of the National
Labor Relations Act as amended by the Taft-Hartley Act
(hereinafter called "the Act" when referred to in its en-
tirety as amended) impelled the Supreme Court to grant
certiorari in the above three cases consolidated on appeal.
The decisive part of section 8(a) (3) reads:
"(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an
employer-
(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure
of employment or any term or condition of employment
to encourage or discourage membership in any labor
organization: ... "I
In all three cases sufficient facts existed to show discrimi-
nation on the employer's part towards the employee.' But
once the basic fact that the employer had discriminated
* Of the Baltimore Bar; A.B., 1953, LL.B., 1954, University of Maryland.1347 U. S. 17 (1954). Three cases consolidated.
2 Section 8(a) (3) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended in
1947 by the Taft-Hartley Act, 65 Stat. 601, 29 U. S. C. (Supp. V), Section
158(a) (3), 29 U. S. C. A., Section 158(a) (3).
8 In regards to the Gaynor case even Mr. Justice Black says in his dis-
sent, "Unquestionably payment of disparate wages to union and non-
union employees is 'discrimination' as that term is used in §8(a) (3)". He
also remarks as to Radio Officers' and Teamsters:
"The Board found on sufficient evidence that each of the two unions
here 'caused' an employer to treat an employee differently from the
way it treated other employees, that Is, the employer was caused 'to
discriminate' within the meaning of §8(a) (3)." Supra, n. 1, di8. op.
57, 61.
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against the employee had been established, conflict arose
over whether express proof was essential to show that this
discrimination encouraged or discouraged employees in
their outlook towards the union, or whether the Board
should have the right to infer this from facts presented
before it?
The proceedings in the Teamsters case were brought by
one Frank Boston against his union. Boston was a truck
driver employed by the Byers Transportation Company.
There was a seniority list established by the company un-
der a collective bargaining agreement it had with the union.
Because Boston failed to pay his union dues on time, he
was dropped in seniority, and correspondingly, did not re-
ceive those driving assignments he otherwise would have
obtained. The issue was whether or not Byers acted to en-
courage union membership. No direct evidence was mus-
tered to show its move was prompted by this motive, but
the Board concluded that this was the reason because the
company knew that such end would be the natural and
probable result of its actions; consequently, the union
violated section 8(b) (1) and 8(b) (2) by impelling the
company to drop Boston on the seniority list.' Upon peti-
tion the Eighth Circuit refused to grant a decree enforcing
the Board's order on the grounds that no express evidence
had been produced to prove that this motive actually stimu-
lated the employer's discrimination and that the Board
could not infer such.5
In the Radio and Gaynor cases, the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals took a diametrically opposite point of view to
that held by the Eighth in Teamsters.
The Board order required the Company to:
"1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Causing or attempting to cause Byers Transportation Company,
Inc., its officers, agents, . . . to reduce the seniority of, or otherwise dis-
criminate against, any of its employees because they are delinquent in
their payment of dues to International Brotherhood of Teamsters ... ,
Local Union No. 41, A. F. L., except in accordance with Section 8(a) (3)
of the Act." International Brotherhood of Teamsters, etc., 94 NLRB
1494, 1497 (1951).
As Judge Thomas said for the majority of the Eighth Circuit:
"Having considered the record as a whole we can find no substantial
evidence to support the conclusion that the discrimination in regard to
the tenure or condition of employment of Boston did or would encourage
or discourage membership in any labor organization." National Labor
Rel. Bd. v. International Brotherhood, 196 F. 2d 1, 4 (8th Cir., 1952).
Since there was enough evidence to prove a discrimination, the Court
substitutes its judgment for that of the Board and concludes that it
was not reasonable for the Board to infer that this discrimination en-
couraged an increase in union membership. The result would be to re-
quire express evidence that such discrimination encouraged member-
ship.
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Radio had its beginning in a complaint made to the
National Labor Relations Board by a member of the Radio
Officers' Union. One Willard Christian Fowler reported to
this agency that the A. H. Bull Steamship Company refused
to hire him because of a request made by the union secre-
tary. There was a collective bargaining agreement between
the union and the company covering the filling of vacancies.
The company agreed to hire only those men in good stand-
ing with the union. The former had notified Fowler that
there was a position to be filled and that it wished to hire
him. Fowler neglected to obtain clearance from the union
and the former holder of the position reported this action
to the Radio Officers' Union. The latter's secretary re-
quested the company not to employ Fowler in that he was
suspended for "edging" another member. The secretary
actually did not have the authority to suspend Fowler;
thus, the complainant was in good standing at all times up
to the time the case was instituted. The Board upon these
facts concluded that the union violated section 8(b) (2) of
the Act, and issued a cease and desist order against it.6
Later an enforcement decree was granted the Board on
petition. The Court reasoned that there was substantial
evidence showing that the action of the union precipitated
a discrimination against Fowler by his employer which had
the natural and probable effect of encouraging union
membership.7
In the third case, the Gaynor News Company had an
agreement with the Newspaper and Mail Deliverers' Union
of New York which allowed for special wages and paid
vacations. Not all employees in the delivery department
were union members. A supplementary contract provided
that in case the parties entered into a new agreement the
wage rates set therein would be retroactive for three
months. In 1948 a new agreement was made between the
company and the union which provided for increased wage
and vacation benefits. The union was touted as the exclu-
sive bargaining agent for all the employees in the delivery
department. Under the supplementary agreement the com-
pany retroactively paid the new wage and vacation benefits
SRadio Officers' Union of Commercial Telegraphers Union, 93 NLRB
1523, 1528 (1951).
?Ohief Judge Swan, in speaking for the majority, said:
"Refusal of clearance caused the company to discriminate against
Fowler in regard to hire. Without the necessary clearance it could not
accept him as an employee. The result was to encourage membership in
the union. No threats or promises to the company were necessary."
National Labor Relations Bd. v. Radio Officers' Union, 196 F. 2d 960,
965 (2d Cir., 1952).
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to union men; it did not make these payments to non-union
personnel. One of these, Sheldon Loner, filed charges
against the company alleging a violation of the Act. The
Board agreed with this contention by holding that the com-
pany had violated section 8(a) (3) of the Act by using
union membership or non-membership as a line of demar-
cation in its disparate policy towards the delivery depart-
ment employees.' The defense of the company that the
record disclosed no evidence that the discrimination en-
couraged non-union men to join the union was rejected by
the Board which reasoned that the company knew that the
natural and probable results of its action would be an en-
couragement.9 The Court of Appeals upheld the Board
in saying:
"Discriminatory conduct, such as that practiced
here, is inherently conducive to increase union mem-
bership. In this respect, there can be little doubt that
it 'encourages' union membership, by increasing the
number of workers who would like to join and/or their
quantum of desire."'"
The view taken by the Second Circuit Court in the
Gaynor and the Radio cases that the NLRB has a right to
draw reasonable inferences from the facts before it has
had support in the First, Fourth and Ninth Circuits." On
the other hand, other circuits had held that the Board
must have some express evidence to support its conclu-
sions. 2 This split among the circuits concerning the in-
' Gaynor News Company, Inc., 93 NLRB 299 (1951).
9 Ibid.10 National Labor Relations Board v. Gaynor News Co., 197 F. 2d 719,
722 (2nd Cir., 1952).
n Judge Hartigan, writing the opinion for the First Circuit in National
Labor Relations Bd. v. Whitin Machine Works, 204 F. 2d 833, 887 (Ist Cir.,
1953) :
"On the record before us, we can only say that there is substantial
evidence from which to infer that Tancrell was fired because he had
asked Mrs. Cahill to assist him in activity which Is protected by the Act.
Where conflicting inferences may be drawn it is not for us to disagree
with the findings of the Board."
He then cited National Labor Relations Bd. v. Southland Mfg. Co., 201 F.
2d 244 (4th Cir., 1952), infra, circa, n. 14. See also National Labor Rela-
tions Bd. v. Walt Disney Productions, 146 F. 2d 44 (9th Cir., 1944).
1 The Court said in National Labor Rel. Bd. v. Reliable Newspaper Del.,
187 F. 2d 547, 552 (3rd Cir., 1950) :
"Generally speaking, the proposition that in order to establish an
8(a) (3) violation there must be evidence that the employer's act en-
couraged or discouraged union membership has widespread support."
See Western Cartridge Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 139 F. 2d
855 (7th Cir., 1943), which held there had to be evidence to prove an em-
ployer's discrimination discouraged membership in the Union. (The Court
said this on a rehearing.)
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ference drawing powers of this administrative agency
points up the significance of the instant case. The opinion
sets forth the Court's view on the effect which section
8(a) (3) exerts upon the power of the NLRB to draw con-
clusions, thereby reflecting the view of the Court as to the
inference drawing powers of administrative agencies gen-
erally. Up until these cases, lawyers and judges had not
been sure exactly what stand the Supreme Court would
take as to the effect that the Taft-Hartley Act might have
on the review power of the Appellate courts on NLRB
matters."8 Should the appellate courts take the same posi-
tion that they maintain towards a tribunal sitting in equity
or without jury? Or should they adopt a different attitude
towards the administrative board? When two reasonable
but differing inferences may be drawn from the same
premise, should they allow the Board's finding to stand or
instead substitute their own judgment?
Earlier opinions written in the Fourth Circuit by Chief
Judge Parker and Associate Judge Soper discuss the prob-
lem in National Labor Relations Board v. Southland Mfg.
Co.'4 Chief Judge Parker argues that the only duty of the
Circuit Courts is to see that there has been enough evidence
before the Board to uphold the feasibility of its conclusion.15
He says that the review made by the Circuit Courts of
Appeal should be one to secure NLRB action based on a
study of all the evidence instead of upon parts of it.'0
Judge Parker makes it clear that the Supreme Court
in Universal Camera Corp. v. National Labor Relations
Board," did not go so far as to say that the Circuit Courts
could substitute their judgment for that of the Board's
when two reasonable but differing inferences could be
Supra, ns. 11, 12.
14201 F. 2d 244 (4th Cir., 1952).
15Ibid, 248. Judge Parker expresses the view of the Fourth Circuit in
saying:
"This Court has never taken any other view than that the substan-
tiality of the testimony to support the Board's findings must be deter-
mined from the record considered as a whole. The question here is,
whether in considering the whole record, there is substantial evidence
of circumstances from which the conclusion of discriminatory dis-
charge can legitimately be drawn .... We wish to make it clear, how-
ever, that the Courts have not fallen into the Serbonlan Bog, which
Congress so carefully avoided, of adopting the rule applicable In equity
appeals for reviewing administrative agency action."
See also Eastern Coal Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 176 F. 2d
131 (4th Cir., 1949).
" Ibid.
1 340 U. S. 474 (1951).
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drawn from the same facts.' His argument is subsequently
paralleled by that line of thought expressed by Judge
Chase in his part-concurring, part-dissenting opinion to
the Second Circuit Court of Appeal's decision in National
Labor Relations Board v. Gaynor News Service.9
In concurring in the Southland case, Judge Soper
thought that Universal Camera went further than merely
expressing the Court's dissatisfaction over the application
of the substantial evidence rule by the circuit courts in
reviewing cases up from the Labor Board. His view was
that the Taft-Hartley Act, as interpreted in the Universal
Camera case, augmented the reviewing Court's power of
review to the extent of allowing the judiciary to substitute
its judgment for that of the Board's whenever it deemed it
1s The majority opinion in Southland Mfg. Co., 8spra, n. 14, 248, restates
the following passage from Universal Camera, supra, n. 14:
"To be sure, the requirement for canvassing 'the whole record' in
order to ascertain substantiality does not furnish a calculus of value
by which a reviewing court can assess the evidence. Nor was it in-
tended to negative the function of the Labor Board as one of those
agencies presumably equipped or informed by experience to deal with
a specialized field of knowledge, whose findings within that field carry
the authority of an expertness which courts do not possess and there-
fore must respect. Nor does it mean that even as to matters not requir-
ing expertise a court may displace the Board's choice between two
fairly conflicting views, even though the Court would justifiably have
made a different choice had the matter been before it de novo."
" Supra, n. 10, 724. Chase (concurring in part and dissenting in part):
"I agree with my brothers that the unfair labor practices found were
established by the evidence and differ with them only in that I would
enforce the order as made by the Board. As was said in International
Association of Machinists, etc. v. National Labor Relations Board, 311
U. S. 72, 82, 61 S. Ct. 83, 89, 85 L. Ed. 50, 'It is for the Board not the
courts to determine how the effect of prior unfair labor practices may
be expunged. National Labor Relations Board v. Pennsylvania Grey-
hound Lines, 303 U. S. 261, 271, 58 S. Ct. 571, 576, 82 L. Ed. 831;
National Labor Relations Board v. Falk Corp., 308 U. S. 543, 461; 60
S. Ot. 307, 311, 84 L. Ed. 396.' Indeed, it is not because the remedy
Itself is wrong but only because the Board has not acted upon the
union's petition for certification, while the unfair labor practices of
which the union is in part the beneficiary remain in effect, that my
brothers are withholding full enforcement. That seems to be such an
unjustifiable interference with the power of the Board to exercise its
sound discretion that I can not subscribe to it."
It must be understood that the majority enforced the Board's order only
after modifying it. So one may suppose that although the Court did not
feel that it had the right to completely substitute its judgment for that of
the Board in that it felt that the latter's conclusions were on the whole
reasonable, it did take upon itself to modify the order because it felt as
originally stated such order was much too harsh. Thus, it still, to a lesser
degree, substituted its judgment for that of the Board's. This is apparently
what Judge Chase disagrees with; he appears to be nearly unequivocally
for the idea 'that the Court should rarely substitute its judgment for that
of the NLRB.
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necessary.20 Judge Soper respects the Board's "expertise",
but still implies "soft-pedaling" when considering its merit
in evaluating an agency decision. He does not think that
the Board's judgment should have as much finality as is
accorded by Chief Judge Parker.2' Upon comparison, it is
apparent that this view is comparable to that taken by the
Eighth Circuit in Teamsters.22
In affirming Gaynor and Radio, while reversing Team-
sters in the instant case, the Supreme Court says flatly that
the Board may draw a conclusion as to the effect of an
employer's action towards his employees so long as it is
reasonably derived from those facts before it.2 3 There need
not be separate and direct evidence of every conclusion
of fact. Reasonable inferences of fact may be drawn.
Analysis discloses that the reasoning that the Court uses
in affirming the Second Circuit stems from basic adminis-
trative law theory. The "expertise" of an administrative
agency in a particular field sets the agency apart from the
judiciary. This quality (ordinarily) merits more weight to
be given a conclusion made by an agency than to that
drawn by a court on the same point.24 Consequently, the
20 "But it is now obvious that we may not continue to apply the rules
which we announced in West Virginia Glass Speciality Co. v. N.L.R.B.,
4 Cir., 134 F. 2d 551, before the Acts of 1946 and 1947 were passed, and
which we repeated in Eastern Coal Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 4 Cir., 176 F. 2d
131, after these statutes were enacted. Specifically we may not say
that the findings of fact of the Board must be sustained unless the sup-
porting evidence is so weak that we would direct a verdict if the case
had been tried by a jury; and we may not say broadly 'that it is be-
yond our power to inquire whether the findings are so clearly erroneous
that an injustice has been done, or that we are not permitted in any
case to substitute our judgment for that of the Board." Supra, n. 14, 250.
2 "True it is that the judgment of the Board is entitled to respect, and
weight must be given to its expertness in its specialized field and we
may not try the case de novo or displace the Board's choice between
two fairly conflicting views; yet we must exercise our independent
judgment and substitute it for that of the Board's if it is clear to us
that the Board has not made a fair estimate of the worth of the testi-
mony or we cannot conscientiously find that the supporting evidence
is substantial when viewed In the light supplied by the entire record,
including the evidence opposed by the Board's view." Ibid. Cf. n. 18.
SOf. n. 5 with n. 20.
"Since encouragement of union membership is obviously a natural
and forseeable consequence of any employer discrimination at the re-
quest of a union, those employers must be presumed to have intended
such encouragement. It follows that it was eminently reasonable for
the Board to infer encouragement of union membership, and the Eighth
Circuit erred in holding encouragement not proved." 347 U. S. 17,
52 (1954).
24 Professor Davis says in his text on ADmINIsmRATIvE LAW:
"The one element that stands out above all others is the comparative
qualification of the agency and of the court to decide the particular
question." DAVIs, ADMINIsTRATivE LAW (1951), Sec. 248, p. 893.
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appellate court may not substitute its judgment for that of
the Board's as it might with regard to a lower tribunal.
Its power is limited to reviewing the substantiality of the
evidence on the whole record. This is primarily what the
Supreme Court said in Universal Camera.2" The Radio
Operator's Union26 case emphasizes this to be the Court's
view by dispelling the belief that as interpreted in Uni-
versal Camera the Taft-Hartley Act negates the Labor
Board's power to draw inferences as previously permitted
under the Wagner Act and extended in the Republic Avia-
tion27 case. The Court supports the Labor Board's having
the right to draw reasonable inferences as previously, but
the inferences must be reasonable in the light of all the
evidence before it and not related solely to some part of
it without regard to the record as a whole.
Mr. Justices Burton and Minton joined Mr. Justice
Frankfurter's concurring opinion which delineates and
clarifies that of the majority.2 This opinion poses two alter-
native interpretations of section 8(a) (3) and then selects
that one allowing the Board to conclude that the employer's
conduct had a tendency to encourage or discourage union
membership.29 It points out that the Court voices approval
of the NLRB possessing the power to "reasonably infer"
from the facts laid before it3 0 On the other hand, the
Court need not always uphold the Board's conclusion. Any
order issued because of a decision based on only part of
the record would be deemed unreasonable and thereby be
looked upon unfavorably by the Justices. However, if the
Board weighs all the evidence before it, it appears that
their decision would have to be most arbitrary before the
2 Supra, n. 17.
"In Univer8al Camera, 340 U. S. 474, we carefully considered this
legislative history and interpreted it to express dissatisfaction with too
restricted application of the 'substantial evidence' test of the Wagner
Act. We noted, however, that sufficiency of evidence to support find-
ings of fact was not involved In the Republic Aviation case, and stated
that the amendment was not 'intended to negative the function of the
Labor Board as one of those agencies presumably equipped or informed
by experience to deal with a specialized field of knowledge, . . .' There
is nothing in the language of 'the amendment itself that suggests denial
to the Board of the power to draw reasonable inferences." Supra, n.
23, 50.
-324 U. S. 793 (1945).
2 Mr. Justice Frankfurter, concurring:
"Since, guidance in the exercise of this discretion by the Labor Board,
and not merely guidance for litigants, thus becomes a function of the
Court's opinion, it is doubly necessary to define 'the scope of our ruling
as explicitly as possible." Supra, n. 23, conc. op. 55.
Ibid, 55, 56.
aDIbid.
1955]
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Supreme Court would uphold a substitution of judgment
by a Circuit Court of Appeals. s"
Mr. Justices Black and Douglas dissented. In regard
to Gaynor, they do not agree with the new construction
given section 8(a) (3) by the Labor Board and upheld by
the majority. Justice Black tends to substitute his judg-
ment for that of the Board in saying:
"I think the Court's new interpretation of §8(a) (3)
imputes guilt to an employer for conduct which Con-
gress did not wish to outlaw."'82
It is reasonable to suppose that the Gaynor News Com-
pany knew that the natural and probable results of its dis-
crimination would be an encouraging of membership in
the union. On the other hand, it is logical to assume that
Congress did not mean to penalize an employer exercising
his judgment in fixing working conditions unless he dis-
criminates to vary the strength of the union for his own
gain. 4 However, between the two logical and reasonable
constructions of the phrase "by discrimination in regard to
hire or tenure of employment.., to encourage or discourage
membership in any labor organization: . . . that of the
Board should prevail.8 6
The second part of the dissent is concerned with Radio
and Teamsters, but is based upon the same reasoning set
forth in that part of the opinion that discusses Gaynor.
Justice Black does not think the unions in Radio and
Teamsters violated section 8(b) (2) of the Act in making
their requests to the companies because a violation of sec-
tion 8(b) (2) depends on a violation of 8(a) (3) and the com-
panies here did not violate section 8(a) (3) by discriminat-
ing against their employees.8 Apparently the two dissent-
U "Of course, there will be cases in which the circumstances under
which the employer acted serve to rebut any inference that might be
drawn from his acts of alleged discrimination standing alone."
"In sum, any inference that may be drawn from the employer's
alleged discriminatory acts Is just one element of evidence which may
or may not be sufficient, without more, to show a violation. . . The
Board's task is to weigh everything before it, including those infer-
ences which, with its specialized experience, It believes can fairly be
drawn." Ibid.
M3 4 7 U. S. 17 (1954), dis. op. 57, 58.
Ibid, 36-38, 52.
- Ibid, 60.
Supra, n. 2.
Supra, n. 24.
They did not do it voluntarily for their own gain, 8upra, n. 34:
"A union does not violate §8(b) (2) by causing an employer to dis-
criminate unless that employer discrimination is 'in violation of
§8(a) (3)'." Supra, n. 30, 61.
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ing justices foster the view that there should have been
evidence expressly pointing out that the companies dis-
criminated against the employees to encourage union mem-
bership. 8 They do not seem to think that the Board should
have as broad a right to infer as shown in these three cases."
While the instant decisions deal only with the Labor
Board, their larger and more significant import is apparent.
As previously mentioned, the majority rests heavily on the
NLRB's "expertise" in labor relations as a reason for allow-
ing its broad inferences."° Of necessity, the same reasoning
carries over to other agencies, which are assessed with the
responsibility of administering statutes controlling par-
ticular areas of economic importance and requiring de-
velopment of specialized knowledge for their proper
administration.
Many commentators favor the principle of comparative
qualifications being used as a governing criteria in fixing
the scope of review given decisions made by administrative
agencies.41 But this works best only when tempered by
giving additional consideration to the particular field over
which the agency presides and to the particular case before
such agency. For example, it would seem that no one
would normally question the superiority of an F.C.C. de-
cision that depended upon a fine point in electronics, where
the Commission is required to have special skill and ex-
perience.42 On the other hand, there are many matters in-
volved in agency decisions, Where judicial competence ex-
ceeds that of the agency. 8 As to such matters the shadow
of indecision looms and the authorities hedge.4 In the area
of the instant cases, it could be felt that judges may have
2 "The Board also found that this 'discrimination' had a tendency to
encourage union membership. But there was no finding that either em-
ployer's discrimination occurred in order to encourage union member-
ship. For the reasons set out in my discussion of §8(a) (3) in the
Gaynor case I think these findings fall short of showing 'an employer
'violation of §8(a) (3)'." Supra, n. 32, 61.
U Of. the text of Justice Black's dissent with the concurrence of Judge
Soper in NLRB v. Southland Mfg. Co., supra, n. 21.
10 Supra, n. 26, where the text of the opinion showing the majority's posi-
tion is quoted.
1DAvis, too. cit., supra, n. 24, 893, says: "Variation in intensiveness of
review in accordance with comparative qualifications is so natural as to be
almost inevitable whatever the theoretical formula." In footnote 113, he
says: "Landis expressed the belief that 'the extent of review is being
shaped . . . by reference to an appreciation of 'the qualities of expertness
for decision that the administrative may possess'."
a "When a problem of radio engineering has been decided by the FCC's
technicians, one can hardly expect legally trained judges to substitute
judgment." Ibid, 894.
" Ibid,
" Ibid.
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the capacity to decide many labor problems as well as the
NLRB, and that the concept of "expertise" has been ex-
tended beyond its proper and useful scope. In at least one
comment, attention has been called to the fact that Con-
gress had some such feeling in passing the Taft-Hartley
Act.45 It would seem that the majority of the Supreme
Court, however, is obviously inclined to require more ex-
plicit direction from Congress before allowing reviewing
courts to substitute their judgment as to the inferences
that may be reasonably drawn from evidence in the area
of the agency's competence such as is involved in the in-
stant cases. It would seem, also, that this could carry over
into other related matters for the same agency, the NLRB,
and as to similar matters for all other agencies.
INSANITY AS A DEFENSE - McNAGHTEN RULE
REPUDIATED BY DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
Durham v. United States'
By MATHIAS J. DE VITO*
Defendant was convicted of housebreaking by the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia.
The only defense asserted at the trial was that the accused
was of unsound mind at the time of the offense. The defen-
dant had a long history of imprisonment and hospitaliza-
tion. From the time of his discharge for psychiatric rea-
sons from the Navy in 1945 until May of 1951, two months
before the offense, the defendant-had been committed and
released from a mental hospital three times after having
been found insane at insanity inquiries. After the commis-
sion of the housebreaking offense he was admitted to a
mental hospital for the fourth time for sixteen months
45 "The language of the conference and committee reports to 'the LMRA
indicate Congress was no longer impressed with the Board's expert
knowledge and disapproved of certain of its decisions. But what it
enacted was an enlargement of the scope of review over the Board's
decisions. It did not explicitly take away the Board's power of in-
ference, and thereby eliminate one of the basic reasons for the Board's
existence." 40 Va. L. Rev. 494, 496 (1954).
* Second year student, University of Maryland School of Law.
'214 F. 2d 862 (D. C. Cir., 1954). This decision has been followed by a
great deal of discussion in periodical literature. A partial list follows: 54
Colum. L. Rev. 1153 (1954) ; 68 Harv. L. Rev. 364 (1954) ; 40 Va. L. Rev.
799 (1954) ; 28 So. Calif. L. Rev. 86 (1954) ; 40 Cornell L. Q. 135 (1954) ;
23 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 225 (1954); 43 Geo. L. J. 58 (1954); 22 Chic. L.
Rev. 317.
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